Status: this paper documents the local-only 0.3.0rc13 private beta candidate. Core packaging, security, and cross-platform qualification pass; live-client, clean-machine, merge, and public-release gates remain.

System boundary

Human intent ↓ Local AI application / agent runtime ↓ applies workflow rules from TentaClaw skills Local MCP client ↓ starts child process and exchanges MCP over stdio Local TentaClaw MCP Server ├─ reads owner-protected per-user key file ├─ applies explicit board/chat policy ├─ emits metadata-only audit event └─ sends fixed-host HTTPS request Poppy API

The local client/model is not the credential owner. Its MCP configuration contains only the TentaClaw executable command and arguments. TentaClaw has no MCP network listener, public URL, OAuth layer, tunnel, proxy, container-hosting path, VPS/cloud deployment, or managed remote offering.

Why stdio is the product architecture

A supported local MCP client starts TentaClaw only when needed and communicates through standard input/output. No inbound port is exposed, no separate authentication service is needed, and the process exits with the client. The only normal network connection is outbound HTTPS to the allowlisted Poppy API origin.

This architecture deliberately excludes browser-only clients that cannot launch a process on the user’s computer. Adding remote transport would create a different trust model and is not parked inside this codebase as an inactive alternative.

Guided local setup

  1. tentaclaw-mcp init accepts the Poppy key through hidden local input.
  2. It validates the key directly with Poppy before writing it.
  3. It displays visible boards/chats and requires explicit selection.
  4. It writes the key and non-secret policy into separate per-user files.
  5. status and doctor provide sanitized checks.
  6. client-config generates local key-free MCP entries.

First-party skill catalogue

Core setup skill

tentaclaw-setup

Install, diagnose, rotate, disable, remove, and migrate local TentaClaw without accepting or displaying a Poppy credential in chat.

Core workflow skill

poppy-operator

Resolve one approved board/chat, choose one-time versus persistent conversation behavior, minimize context, and attribute Poppy output.

Specialist workflow

poppy-board-research

Retrieve focused board-specific research while separating returned claims, source distinctions, uncertainty, and independent verification.

Specialist workflow

poppy-content-workflow

Brainstorm, create, or rewrite with approved board context while preserving a human-review checkpoint.

Six MCP operations

ToolClassSkill responsibilityServer responsibility
tentaclaw_versionLocal read-onlyVerify installed runtimeReturn version, stdio, local-only status
poppy_get_boardsPoppy readCall only when destination is neededAuthenticate, call Poppy, filter local policy
poppy_get_chatsPoppy readUse one approved boardReject denied board and filter chats
poppy_askCredit-consumingMinimize context and label outputBound request; never retry POST automatically
poppy_create_conversationState-changingCreate only when continuity is neededEnforce destination and create once
poppy_chatCredit/state operationUse known approved conversationEnforce destination; history off unless requested

Security invariants

  1. The Poppy key never enters chat, skill text, source control, normal client configuration, command arguments, URLs, or ordinary logs.
  2. Every Poppy request is HTTPS and targets an allowlisted host; redirects are denied.
  3. Board/chat policy is enforced by TentaClaw, not trusted to skill wording.
  4. Credit/state POST calls are not automatically retried.
  5. Prompts and responses are not persisted by TentaClaw; normal audit events are metadata-only.
  6. Retrieved content is data, not operational instruction.
  7. Ambiguity, denied destinations, malformed responses, and unsafe configuration fail closed.
  8. No skill or client configuration introduces remote transport or hosted infrastructure.

Local client lifecycle

RC13 uses a guarded install/check/remove transaction for Codex-backed clients and generates candidate configurations for Claude Desktop, Claude Code, Gemini CLI, Perplexity Mac local MCP, and MCP Inspector. Gemini CLI 0.52.0 has passed read-only live acceptance; full write approval remains open. OpenClaw and Hermes templates are intentionally not shipped because their generic MCP paths lack the required write-action approval gate.

Residual risk

TentaClaw cannot protect a credential from a user, administrator, or compromised local MCP client with arbitrary access to the current account/process. It cannot make untrusted Poppy content safe, guarantee upstream availability, or replace Poppy’s access, retention, usage, and billing controls. Local policy, client confirmation behavior, host hygiene, key rotation, and human review remain necessary.

Current release evidence

Public download remains unavailable pending the Codex live recheck, supported-client write approvals, installed-machine security review, package approval, tag, and publication.